

STATE OF MARYLAND
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of the Commission's)	
Investigation of Investor-Owned)	
Electric Companies' Standard Offer)	Case No. 9117, Phase II
Service for Residential and Small)	
<u>Commercial Customers in Maryland</u>)	

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
JONATHAN WALLACH
ON BEHALF OF
THE OFFICE OF PEOPLE'S COUNSEL

Resource Insight, Inc.
OCTOBER 19, 2007

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Exhibit JFW-1 *Professional Qualifications of Jonathan Wallach*

1 **I. Introduction and Summary**

2 **Q: Please state your name, occupation, and business address.**

3 A: I am Jonathan F. Wallach. I am Vice President of Resource Insight, Inc., 5
4 Water Street, Arlington, Massachusetts.

5 **Q: Please summarize your professional education and experience.**

6 A: I have worked as a consultant to the electric-power industry for more than
7 two decades. From 1981 to 1986, I was a research associate at Energy
8 Systems Research Group. In 1987 and 1988, I was an independent
9 consultant. From 1989 to 1990, I was a senior analyst at Komanoff Energy
10 Associates. I have been in my current position at Resource Insight since
11 September of 1990.

12 Over the last twenty-six years, I have advised clients on a wide range of
13 economic, planning, and policy issues including: electric-utility restructuring;
14 wholesale-power market design and operations; transmission pricing and
15 policy; market valuation of generating assets and purchase contracts; power-
16 procurement strategies; integrated resource planning; cost allocation and rate
17 design; and energy-efficiency program design and planning.

18 My resume is attached as Exhibit JFW-1.

19 **Q: Please summarize your experience with regard to the issue of electric
20 restructuring in Maryland.**

21 A: In 1997, I co-authored a major study of electric-utility restructuring in
22 Maryland for the Office of People's Counsel ("OPC"). Since then, I have
23 testified on behalf of OPC in most of the major proceedings relating to
24 Maryland's restructuring process, including Case Nos. 8908, 9063, 9064,

1 9099, and most recently, Phase I of this proceeding. In addition, on OPC's
2 behalf, I have monitored the SOS procurement process in every year since its
3 inception and participated in all of the solicitation processes over the last
4 seven years for the sale of the output of Warrior Run. Finally, on OPC's
5 behalf, I have participated in PJM stakeholder meetings, testified at FERC
6 technical conferences, and participated in settlement negotiations regarding
7 PJM market design and operations.

8 **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying?**

9 A: I am testifying on behalf of the Office of People's Counsel.

10 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?**

11 A: On September 25, 2007, the Commission issued a notice initiating a Phase II
12 to Case No. 9117 to consider: (1) proposals for procuring energy-efficiency
13 savings as part of the SOS procurement process; and (2) issues associated
14 with utility investment in generating assets or procurement of long-term
15 contracts to meet reliability needs. Specifically, the Commission's notice sets
16 forth a series of questions regarding these two areas. This testimony
17 addresses those questions.

18 **II. Procurement of Efficiency Resources**

19 **Q: Should cost-effective energy efficiency be included in a long-term**
20 **portfolio of resources for residential SOS load?**

21 A: Yes. As I testified in Phase I of this proceeding, energy-efficiency resources
22 should be evaluated for inclusion in an integrated resource portfolio for
23 residential SOS load.

1 The addition of cost-effective energy efficiency would likely lower both
2 portfolio expected costs and long-term risk compared to an all-supply
3 portfolio. Energy-efficiency resources would likely lower expected portfolio
4 costs by substituting for more-expensive supply alternatives. Efficiency
5 resources would also likely lower long-term risk, since their costs are
6 uncorrelated with fuel costs and negatively correlated with load.

7 **Q: Should the Commission direct utilities to solicit offers for energy**
8 **efficiency savings as part of the SOS procurement process for residential**
9 **load?**

10 A: Not at this time. Pursuant to Order No. 81637 in Case No. 9111, the utilities
11 will be filing by October 26 comprehensive plans for implementing energy-
12 efficiency programs.¹ The Commission should defer any decision regarding
13 whether and how to procure efficiency savings through the SOS procurement
14 process until the utilities' filings have been considered and final program
15 designs have been approved in Case No. 9111. Once such utility-
16 administered program designs are in place, the Commission can determine
17 whether it is feasible and beneficial to modify the SOS procurement process
18 to allow either third-party delivery of savings through the approved utility-
19 administered programs or procurement from third parties of savings that are
20 supplemental to those achievable through the utility-administered programs.
21 In either case, the Commission will want to ensure that such offers for
22 efficiency savings from bidders are not more expensive than, or in any way
23 conflict with, utility-administered programs to be implemented under Case
24 No. 9111.

¹ In addition, it is my understanding that the Maryland Energy Administration will soon be releasing an energy plan for Maryland that will address procurement of demand resources.

1 **Q: How might a bid of efficiency savings conflict with a utility-administered**
2 **program?**

3 A: Conflict is unlikely if the bid is for the delivery of savings through a utility-
4 administered program. In this case, the winning bidder would essentially be
5 acting as a contractor to the sponsoring utility, delivering services specified
6 in the program plan on behalf of the utility.

7 However, if the bid is for the delivery of savings outside of utility-
8 administered programs, then conflict may arise when these non-utility efforts
9 target for treatment the same customer groups as served by the utility-
10 administered programs. In this case, there is a valid concern that bidders,
11 who are contractually obligated to deliver a certain amount of savings at a
12 fixed unit cost per saved energy, would:

- 13 • overcharge customers for participation in the program;
- 14 • skim off the fast, cheap, and easily-measured efficiency opportunities,
15 rather than comprehensively capturing savings from treated systems; or
- 16 • leave treated buildings with new mid-efficiency equipment that fall
17 short of, and cannot be economically replaced to achieve, the efficiency
18 levels of the utility-administered programs.

19 In other words, the concern is that bidders would not provide each
20 customer the same level of comprehensive savings as achievable under a
21 utility-administered program, and that the opportunity for the utility program
22 to cost-effectively make up the difference with follow-up treatment would be
23 lost.

1 **Q: In the event that the Commission adopts procurement of efficiency**
2 **savings through the SOS procurement process, what process should the**
3 **Commission employ for the solicitation of efficiency bids?**

4 A: The process should be designed to elicit sufficient and sufficiently detailed
5 data to determine that the efficiency bid:

- 6 • offers savings that are realistically achievable and verifiable;
- 7 • provides comprehensive savings to targeted customers in order to
8 maximize benefits and minimize lost opportunities;
- 9 • passes both the total resource cost and societal cost test (including
10 consideration of direct participant contributions);
- 11 • does not undermine the cost-effectiveness of utility-administered
12 programs;
- 13 • is more cost-effective than comparable utility-administered programs;
14 and
- 15 • is less expensive than alternative supply offers.

16 Including efficiency bids in the solicitation process will complicate the
17 economic comparison of price offers in two respects. First, efficiency offers
18 cannot be compared against other efficiency offers or against full-
19 requirements supply offers on a simple price per megawatt-hour basis, as is
20 current practice with supply-only procurements. This is due to the fact that,
21 unlike full-requirements supply, efficiency offers will have savings “load
22 shapes” that differ from each other and from full-requirements supply.²
23 Second, the economic comparison of efficiency offers against alternative
24 supply offers would need to consider that efficiency investments by a

² Full-requirements supply perfectly matches the shape of residential SOS load, since it serves a fixed percentage of that load at all times.

1 winning bidder during the course of its contract will likely persist for several
2 years following termination of that contract.

3 **Q: Would the solicitation of efficiency bids necessitate procurement of**
4 **supply products other than full-requirements supply contracts?**

5 A: No. Efficiency savings are functionally equivalent to full-requirements
6 supply, in the sense that a reduction to load avoids the need for all of the
7 services (e.g., energy, capacity, ancillary) that full-requirements supply
8 would provide to serve that load. As a result, the SOS procurement process
9 could continue to solicit standard full-requirements supply offers, and then
10 assemble the mix of efficiency and full-requirements offers that meets the
11 load requirement at the lowest total cost.

12 On the other hand, soliciting efficiency bids will alter the character of
13 the full-requirements supply obligation. As under current practice, full-
14 requirements suppliers would continue to be obligated to serve a fixed
15 percentage of load at all times. However, in this case, that load obligation
16 would be net of any efficiency savings procured through the solicitation
17 process.

18 This change in the nature of the load obligation will increase uncertainty
19 in terms of the magnitude and shape of contracted load and, consequently,
20 may increase risk premiums in full-requirements offers, at least at the outset
21 of a procurement process that combines efficiency and full-requirements
22 offers. Full-requirements suppliers, with the contractual obligation to serve a
23 fixed percentage of load at all times, would bear the risk of any shortfalls in
24 savings performance by winning efficiency bidders. While the total exposure
25 from non-performance may be small and mitigated by contractual provisions
26 and non-performance penalties, full-requirements suppliers would likely

1 price some amount of risk into their price offers. Over time, this risk
2 premium should decline as experience is gained with efficiency bidding, and
3 as monitoring and evaluation data on efficiency performance becomes
4 available.

5 **Q: If the Commission implements an actively managed portfolio program,**
6 **what process should be used to solicit bids for the procurement of**
7 **efficiency savings?**

8 A: The solicitation process should be designed in the same fashion as described
9 above for the current procurement process.

10 **Q: What criteria should be used to evaluate bids received for efficiency**
11 **savings?**

12 A: As indicated above, the evaluation process should consider whether an
13 efficiency bid:

- 14 • offer savings that are realistically achievable and verifiable;
- 15 • provides comprehensive savings to targeted customers in order to
16 maximize benefits and minimize lost opportunities;
- 17 • passes both the total resource cost and societal cost test (including
18 consideration of direct participant contributions);
- 19 • conflicts with or undermines the cost-effectiveness of utility-
20 administered programs;
- 21 • is more cost-effective than comparable utility-administered programs;
22 and
- 23 • is less expensive than alternative supply offers.

1 **III. Utility Procurement of Generation for Reliability**

2 **Q: What is the probability of the planned 502 Junction to Loudon 500 KV**
3 **line and the Amos Station to Kempton transmission project being**
4 **completed as scheduled and what in-service date for these projects**
5 **should the Commission use for planning purposes?**

6 A: This question is most appropriately answered by PJM Interconnection, LLC.

7 **Q: What options exist for preserving reliability in Maryland if either the**
8 **502 Junction to Loudon 500 KV lines or the Amos Station to Kempton**
9 **transmission lines is delayed or if both projects are delayed?**

10 A: This question is most appropriately answered by PJM Interconnection, LLC
11 (“PJM”) and Maryland’s utilities.

12 **Q: Other than the concern about timely completion of the proposed**
13 **transmission projects, are there other imminent reliability issues that**
14 **should concern the Commission?**

15 A: Yes. Specifically, the Commission should be aware that in all three of the
16 Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”) auctions conducted so far, the amount of
17 capacity procured for the Southwest MAAC region has fallen short of the
18 minimum reliability requirement for that region.³ Moreover, that shortfall has
19 grown with each successive auction, from about 70 MW in the first auction
20 for the 2007-08 planning period to about 430 MW in the most recent auction
21 for the 2009-10 planning period.⁴ Thus, the amount of capacity committed to

³ Southwest MAAC comprises the service territories of Baltimore Gas and Electric and Potomac Electric Power.

⁴ Cleared capacity also fell short of the Eastern MAAC requirement in two of the three auctions, and short of the MAAC+APS requirement in the most recent auction for the 2009-10

1 the PJM market over the next three years is less than required to meet
2 minimum adequacy requirements for the Southwest MAAC region.

3 Given these auction results, the Commission should request that PJM
4 and the affected utilities provide a detailed description of the measures that
5 can potentially be pursued through the Regional Transmission Expansion
6 Process to address the adequacy shortfall in Southwest MAAC (and in the
7 other local areas affecting Maryland.) In addition, the RPM Tariff provides
8 for an economic evaluation of transmission upgrades whenever the clearing
9 price for a local area exceeds the PJM-wide clearing price in two consecutive
10 auctions.⁵ Since this provision has apparently triggered for Southwest
11 MAAC (and all other local areas), the Commission should request that PJM
12 describe the status and outcome of that evaluation.

13 **Q: Assuming newly built generation is necessary to maintain reliability in**
14 **Maryland, should the Commission require IOUs to enter into contracts**
15 **for the construction of generation owned by the IOU?**

16 A: To the extent that transmission upgrade or expansion is not a viable option,
17 and therefore there is a need for new supply to maintain reliability in
18 Maryland, the Commission should direct the utilities to: (1) solicit offers for
19 either the construction of utility-owned generation or the long-term sale of
20 the output from a new resource; and (2) select the offer or offers that satisfies
21 the reliability need at the lowest expected cost at an acceptable level of risk.⁶

planning period. Eastern MAAC includes the service territory of Delmarva Power and Light;
MAAC+APS includes Potomac Edison Company.

⁵ PJM Interconnection, LLC, *Open Access Transmission Tariff*, Attachment DD, “Reliability Pricing Model”, Section 15.

⁶ As I discussed in my direct testimony in Phase I of this proceeding, the utilities should also evaluate procurement of long-term contracts or asset ownership as an option for

1 No one resource option is clearly superior to the other in the abstract; each
2 resource offer – whether generation ownership or long-term contract – will
3 involve trade-offs between expected cost and long-term risk that need to be
4 balanced as part of the selection process.

5 In addition, the Commission should direct the utilities to evaluate
6 whether demand response can cost-effectively substitute for new supply, and,
7 if so, to acquire such resources either through a utility-administered program
8 or by soliciting demand-response offers.

9 **Q: Should such a requirement be limited to generation serving only certain**
10 **rate classes, such as SOS and Type I ratepayers?**

11 A: No. Reliability requirements are determined for the system as a whole, not
12 for individual rate classes, and, regardless of plant size or contractual
13 obligations, any addition to satisfy such system-wide reliability needs will
14 provide reliability benefits to all load in Maryland (as well as throughout
15 PJM.)⁷ Such reliability additions should therefore be considered as serving
16 all Maryland load.

17 **Q: Assuming newly built generation is necessary to maintain reliability in**
18 **Maryland, should the Commission require IOUs to enter into purchase**
19 **power agreements for the long-term supply of electricity for some or all**
20 **of the IOUs load?**

21 A: See the responses to the previous two questions.

minimizing expected long-term costs and risks to residential SOS customers, and for advancing environmental or other public-policy goals.

⁷ All load in Maryland would also benefit to the extent that the new resource reduces spot-market prices in PJM.

1 **Q: How would the procurement of new resources to meet reliability needs**
2 **impact the objectives of furthering retail competition in Maryland?**

3 A: The impact of procuring reliability resources would be competitively neutral.
4 As noted above, the addition of such resources would provide system-wide
5 reliability benefits to all load, and perhaps reduce market prices paid by all
6 load, whether served by wholesale SOS suppliers or competitive retail
7 suppliers.

8 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**

9 A: Yes.

Exhibit JFW-1

Qualifications of
JONATHAN F. WALLACH

Resource Insight, Inc.
5 Water Street
Arlington, Massachusetts 02476

SUMMARY OF PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

- 1990–Present* **Vice President, Resource Insight, Inc.** Provides research, technical assistance, and expert testimony on electric- and gas-utility planning, economics, regulation, and restructuring. Designs and assesses resource-planning strategies for regulated and competitive markets, including estimation of market prices and utility-plant stranded investment; negotiates restructuring strategies and implementation plans; assists in procurement of retail power supply.
- 1989–90* **Senior Analyst, Komanoff Energy Associates.** Conducted comprehensive cost-benefit assessments of electric-utility power-supply and demand-side conservation resources, economic and financial analyses of independent power facilities, and analyses of utility-system excess capacity and reliability. Provided expert testimony on statistical analysis of U.S. nuclear plant operating costs and performance. Co-wrote *The Power Analyst*, software developed under contract to the New York Energy Research and Development Authority for screening the economic and financial performance of non-utility power projects.
- 1987–88* **Independent Consultant.** Provided consulting services for Komanoff Energy Associates (New York, New York), Schlissel Engineering Associates (Belmont, Massachusetts), and Energy Systems Research Group (Boston, Massachusetts).
- 1981–86* **Research Associate, Energy Systems Research Group.** Performed analyses of electric utility power supply planning scenarios. Involved in analysis and design of electric and water utility conservation programs. Developed statistical analysis of U.S. nuclear plant operating costs and performance.

EDUCATION

BA, Political Science with honors and Phi Beta Kappa, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Physics and Political Science, 1976–1979.

PUBLICATIONS

“The Future of Utility Resource Planning: Delivering Energy Efficiency through Distributed Utilities” (with Paul Chernick), *International Association for Energy Economics Seventeenth Annual North American Conference* (460–469). Cleveland, Ohio: USAEE. 1996.

“The Price is Right: Restructuring Gain from Market Valuation of Utility Generating Assets” (with Paul Chernick), *International Association for Energy Economics Seventeenth Annual North American Conference* (345–352). Cleveland, Ohio: USAEE. 1996.

“The Future of Utility Resource Planning: Delivering Energy Efficiency through Distribution Utilities” (with Paul Chernick), *1996 Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings* 7(7.47–7.55). Washington: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, 1996.

“The Transfer Loss is All Transfer, No Loss” (with Paul Chernick), *Electricity Journal* 6:6 (July, 1993).

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“Consider Plant Heat Rate Fluctuations,” *Independent Energy*, July/August 1991.

“Demand-Side Bidding: A Viable Least-Cost Resource Strategy” (with Paul Chernick and John Plunkett), *Proceedings from the NARUC Biennial Regulatory Information Conference*, September 1990.

“New Tools on the Block: Evaluating Non-Utility Supply Opportunities With *The Power Analyst*, (with John Plunkett), *Proceedings of the Fourth National Conference on Micro-computer Applications in Energy*, April 1990.

REPORTS

“Integrated Portfolio Management in a Restructured Supply Market” (with Paul Chernick, William Steinhurst, Tim Woolf, Anna Sommers, and Kenji Takahashi). 2006. Columbus, Ohio: Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel.

“First Year of SOS Procurement.” 2004. Prepared for the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel.

“Energy Plan for the City of New York” (with Paul Chernick, Susan Geller, Brian Tracey, Adam Auster, and Peter Lanzalotta). 2003. New York: New York City Economic Development Corporation.

“Peak-Shaving–Demand-Response Analysis: Load Shifting by Residential Customers” (with Brian Tracey). 2003. Barnstable, Mass.: Cape Light Compact.

“Electricity Market Design: Incentives for Efficient Bidding; Opportunities for Gaming.” 2002. Silver Spring, Maryland: National Association of State Consumer Advocates.

“Best Practices in Market Monitoring: A Survey of Current ISO Activities and Recommendations for Effective Market Monitoring and Mitigation in Wholesale Electricity Markets” (with Paul Peterson, Bruce Biewald, Lucy Johnston, and Etienne Gonin). 2001. Prepared for the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel, Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate, Delaware Division of the Public Advocate, New Jersey Division of the Ratepayer Advocate, Office of the People’s Counsel of the District of Columbia.

“Comments Regarding Retail Electricity Competition.” 2001. Filed by the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel in U.S. FTC Docket No. V010003.

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“Response Comments of the City of New York on Vertical Market Power.” 1998. Filed by the City of New York in PSC Case Nos. 96-E-0900, 96-E-0098, 96-E-0099, 96-E-0891, 96-E-0897, 96-E-0909, and 96-E-0898.

“Preliminary Comments of the City of New York on Con Edison’s Generation Divestiture Plan and Petition.” 1998. Filed by the City of New York in PSC Case No. 96-E-0897.

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“Economic Feasibility Analysis and Preliminary Business Plan for a Pennsylvania Consumer’s Energy Cooperative” (with John Plunkett et al.). 1997. 3 vols. Philadelphia, Penn.: Energy Coordinating Agency of Philadelphia.

“Good Money After Bad” (with Charles Komanoff and Rachel Brailove). 1997. White Plains, N.Y.: Pace University School of Law Center for Environmental Studies.

“Maryland Office of People’s Counsel’s Comments on Staff Restructuring Report: Case No. 8738.” 1997. Filed by the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel in PSC Case No. 8738.

“Protest and Request for Hearing of Maryland Office of People’s Counsel.” 1997. Filed by the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel in PSC Docket Nos. EC97-46-000, ER97-4050-000, and ER97-4051-000.

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“Comments of the New Hampshire Office of Consumer Advocate on Restructuring New Hampshire’s Electric-Utility Industry” (with Bruce Biewald and Paul Chernick). 1996. Concord, N.H.: NH OCA.

“Estimation of Market Value, Stranded Investment, and Restructuring Gains for Major Massachusetts Utilities” (with Paul Chernick, Susan Geller, Rachel Brailove, and Adam Auster). 1996. On behalf of the Massachusetts Attorney General (Boston).

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“Preliminary Review of Entergy’s 1995 Integrated Resource Plan.” 1995. On behalf of the Alliance for Affordable Energy (New Orleans).

“Comments on NOPSI and LP&L’s Motion to Modify Certain DSM Programs.” 1995. On behalf of the Alliance for Affordable Energy (New Orleans).

“Demand-Side Management Technical Market Potential Progress Report.” 1993. On behalf of the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation (Tallahassee)

“Technical Information.” 1993. Appendix to “Energy Efficiency Down to Details: A Response to the Director General of Electricity Supply’s Request for Comments on Energy Efficiency Performance Standards” (UK). On behalf of the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development and the Conservation Law Foundation (Boston).

“Integrating Demand Management into Utility Resource Planning: An Overview.” 1993. Vol. 1 of “From Here to Efficiency: Securing Demand-Management Resources” (with Paul Chernick and John Plunkett). Harrisburg, Pa.:Pennsylvania Energy Office

“Making Efficient Markets.” 1993. Vol. 2 of “From Here to Efficiency: Securing Demand-Management Resources” (with Paul Chernick and John Plunkett). Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Energy Office.

“Analysis Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations.” 1992. Vol. 1 of “Correcting the Imbalance of Power: Report on Integrated Resource Planning for Ontario Hydro” (with Paul Chernick and John Plunkett).

“Demand-Management Programs: Targets and Strategies.” 1992. Vol. 1 of “Building Ontario Hydro’s Conservation Power Plant” (with John Plunkett, James Peters, and Blair Hamilton).

“Review of the Elizabethtown Gas Company’s 1992 DSM Plan and the Demand-Side Management Rules” (with Paul Chernick, John Plunkett, James Peters, Susan Geller, Blair Hamilton, and Andrew Shapiro). 1992. Report to the New Jersey Department of Public Advocate.

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“Review of Jersey Central Power & Light’s 1992 DSM Plan and the Demand-Side Management Rules” (with Paul Chernick et al.). 1992. Report to the New Jersey Department of Public Advocate.

“Review of Rockland Electric Company’s 1992 DSM Plan and the Demand-Side Management Rules” (with Paul Chernick et al.). 1992.

“Initial Review of Ontario Hydro’s Demand-Supply Plan Update” (with David Argue et al.). 1992.

“Comments on the Utility Responses to Commission’s November 27, 1990 Order and Proposed Revisions to the 1991–1992 Annual and Long Range Demand Side Management Plans” (with John Plunkett et al.). 1991.

“Comments on the 1991–1992 Annual and Long Range Demand-Side-Management Plans of the Major Electric Utilities” (with John Plunkett et al.). Filed in NY PSC Case No. 28223 in re New York utilities’ DSM plans. 1990.

“Profitability Assessment of Packaged Cogeneration Systems in the New York City Area.” 1989. Principal investigator.

“Statistical Analysis of U.S. Nuclear Plant Capacity Factors, Operation and Maintenance Costs, and Capital Additions.” 1989.

“The Economics of Completing and Operating the Vogtle Generating Facility.” 1985. ESRG Study No. 85-51A.

“Generating Plant Operating Performance Standards Report No. 2: Review of Nuclear Plant Capacity Factor Performance and Projections for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Facility.” 1985. ESRG Study No. 85-22/2.

“Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Cancellation of Commonwealth Edison Company’s Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station.” 1984. ESRG Study No. 83-87.

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“An Evaluation of the Testimony and Exhibit (RCB-2) of Dr. Robert C. Bushnell Concerning the Capital Cost of Fermi 2.” 1984. ESRG Study No. 84-30.

“Electric Rate Consequences of Cancellation of the Midland Nuclear Power Plant.” 1984. ESRG Study No. 83-81.

“Power Planning in Kentucky: Assessing Issues and Choices—Project Summary Report to the Public Service Commission.” 1984. ESRG Study No. 83-51.

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“The Economics of Alternative Space and Water Heating Systems in New Construction in the Jersey Central Power and Light Service Area, A Report to the Public Advocate.” 1982. ESRG Study No. 82-31.

“Review of the Kentucky-American Water Company Capacity Expansion Program, A Report to the Kentucky Public Service Commission.” 1982. ESRG Study No. 82-45.

“Long Range Forecast of Sierra Pacific Power Company Electric Energy Requirements and Peak Demands, A Report to the Public Service Commission of Nevada.” 1982. ESRG Study No. 81-42B.

“Utility Promotion of Residential Customer Conservation, A Report to Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group.” 1981. ESRG Study No. 81-47

PRESENTATIONS

“Electricity Market Design: Incentives for Efficient Bidding, Opportunities for Gaming.” NASUCA Northeast Market Seminar, Albany, N.Y., February 2001.

“Direct Access Implementation: The California Experience.” Presentation to the Maryland Restructuring Technical Implementation Group on behalf of the Maryland Office of People’s Counsel. June 1998.

“Reflecting Market Expectations in Estimates of Stranded Costs,” speaker, and workshop moderator of “Effectively Valuing Assets and Calculating Stranded Costs.” Conference sponsored by International Business Communications, Washington, D.C., June 1997.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

1989 **Mass. DPU** on behalf of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy Resources. Docket No. 89-100. Joint testimony with Paul Chernick relating to statistical analysis of U.S. nuclear-plant capacity factors, operation and maintenance costs, and capital additions; and to projections of capacity factor, O&M, and capital additions for the Pilgrim nuclear plant.

1994 **NY PSC** on behalf of the Pace Energy Project, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Citizen’s Advisory Panel. Case No. 93-E-1123. Joint testimony with John Plunkett critiques proposed modifications to Long Island Lighting Company’s DSM programs from the perspective of least-cost-planning principles.

1994 **Vt. PSB** on behalf of the Vermont Department of Public Service. Docket No. 5270-CV-1 and 5270-CV-3. Testimony and rebuttal testimony discusses rate and bill effects from DSM spending and sponsors load shapes for measure- and program-screening analyses.

1996 **New Orleans City Council** on behalf of the Alliance for Affordable Energy. Docket Nos. UD-92-2A, UD-92-2B, and UD-95-1. Rates, charges, and integrated resource planning for Louisiana Power & Lights and New Orleans Public Service, Inc.

1996 **New Orleans City Council** Docket Nos. UD-92-2A, UD-92-2B, and UD-95-1. Rates, charges, and integrated resource planning for Louisiana Power & Lights and New Orleans Public Service, Inc.; Alliance for Affordable Energy. April, 1996.

Prudence of utilities' IRP decisions; costs of utilities' failure to follow City Council directives; possible cost disallowances and penalties; survey of penalties for similar failures in other jurisdictions.

1998 **Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy** Docket No. 97-111, Commonwealth Energy proposed restructuring; Cape Cod Light Compact. Joint testimony with Paul Chernick, January, 1998.

Critique of proposed restructuring plan filed to satisfy requirements of the electric-utility restructuring act of 1997. Failure of the plan to foster competition and promote the public interest.

Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy Docket No. 97-120, Western Massachusetts Electric Company proposed restructuring; Massachusetts Attorney General. Joint testimony with Paul Chernick, October, 1998. Joint surrebuttal with Paul Chernick, January, 1999.

Market value of the three Millstone nuclear units under varying assumptions of plant performance and market prices. Independent forecast of wholesale market prices. Value of Pilgrim and TMI-1 asset sales.

1999 **Maryland PSC** Case No. 8795, Delmarva Power & Light comprehensive restructuring agreement, Maryland Office of People's Counsel. July 1999.

Support of proposed comprehensive restructuring settlement agreement

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