

**TESTIMONY OF  
PAUL CHERNICK  
ON BEHALF OF  
SIERRA CLUB AND PUBLIC CITIZEN  
RESOURCE INSIGHT, INC.  
MAY 27, 2016**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

I. Identification and Qualifications ..... 1

II. Introduction..... 2

III. Allocation of Generation Costs ..... 3

IV. Residential Rate Design..... 7

    A. Tiered Energy Rate ..... 7

    B. Fixed Customer Charges ..... 8

V. Rate Discounts Outside the City..... 10

VI. Fayette Costs..... 11

**TABLE OF EXHIBITS**

Exhibit PLC-1    *Professional Qualifications of Paul Chernick*

Exhibit PLC-2    *Prior Testimony Before the Texas PUC*

1 **I. Identification and Qualifications**

2 **Q: Please state your name, occupation and business address.**

3 A: I am Paul L. Chernick. I am the president of Resource Insight, Incorporated,  
4 located at 5 Water Street, Arlington, Massachusetts.

5 **Q: Summarize your professional education and experience.**

6 A: In June 1974, I received a Bachelor of Science degree from the  
7 Massachusetts Institute of Technology from the Civil Engineering  
8 Department. In February 1978 I received a Master of Science degree in  
9 Technology and Policy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

10 I was a utility analyst for the Massachusetts Attorney General for more  
11 than three years, and was involved in numerous aspects of utility rate design,  
12 costing, load forecasting, and the evaluation of power supply options. Since  
13 1981, I have worked as a consultant in utility regulation and planning. From  
14 1981 to 1986 worked as a research associate at Analysis and Inference. In  
15 1986, I founded and became president of PLC, Incorporated, which was  
16 renamed Resource Insight, Incorporated in 1990. In these capacities, I have  
17 advised a variety of clients on utility matters.

18 My work has considered, among other things, the cost-effectiveness of  
19 prospective new generation plants and transmission lines, retrospective  
20 review of generation-planning decisions, ratemaking for plants under  
21 construction, ratemaking for excess and/or uneconomical investments  
22 entering service, conservation program design, cost recovery for utility  
23 efficiency programs, the valuation of environmental externalities from energy  
24 production and use, allocation of costs of service between rate classes and  
25 jurisdictions, design of retail and wholesale rates, and performance-based

1           ratemaking and cost recovery in restructured gas and electric industries. My  
2           professional qualifications are further described in Exhibit PLC-1.

3       **Q: Have you testified previously in utility proceedings?**

4       A: Yes. I have testified as an expert over three hundred times on utility issues  
5           before various regulatory, legislative, and judicial bodies, including utility  
6           regulators in thirty-three states, six Canadian provinces, and two U.S. Federal  
7           agencies. A large number of those cases involved power supply planning,  
8           cost allocation and rate design. My previous testimony before the Public  
9           Utilities Commission of Texas is listed in Exhibit PLC-2.

10      **Q: Do you have any experience with Austin Energy?**

11      A: Yes. I was the Consumer Advocate for the City Council's review of the  
12      Austin Energy rate proposal.

## 13      **II. Introduction**

14      **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying in this rate case proceeding?**

15      A: I am testifying on behalf of Public Citizen and Sierra Club.

16      **Q: What issues do you cover?**

17      A: I address four issues:

- 18           • The allocation of generation costs.
- 19           • The setting of fixed customer charges.
- 20           • Residential rate design, including the tiered energy rate and the form of  
21           the discount for customers outside the city.
- 22           • Preparation for the retirement of Austin Energy's portions of Fayette  
23           units 1 and 2.

1    **III. Allocation of Generation Costs**

2    **Q: How does Austin Energy propose to allocate the fixed costs of its fossil**  
3    **generation plants?**

4    A: Austin Energy proposes to allocate the fixed generation costs on the average  
5    of class contributions to 12 monthly coincident peaks (12CP).<sup>1</sup> In the past,  
6    parties have also suggested that those costs be allocated on the average-and-  
7    excess demand allocator (AED) using the average of four summer peaks  
8    (AED/4CP).

9    **Q: Is either of these allocation approaches appropriate?**

10   A: No. The 12CP method assumes that the fixed costs of Austin Energy’s  
11   generators are exclusively driven by Austin Energy’s monthly peak exposure.  
12   The AED/4CP approach goes further, assuming that only the four summer  
13   peaks matter in determining the fixed generation costs.


14           In reality, the *amount* of capacity needed for reliable supply depends on  
15   the highest loads, both in the high-load months (the summer, for ERCOT)  
16   and in lower-load months when tight power supply may arise from  
17   maintenance outages, weather-related malfunctions and random equipment  
18   failures. ERCOT has experienced Energy Emergency Alerts in the winter (I  
19   have found examples in January, February and March, and there may be  
20   more), as well as the summer.

---

<sup>1</sup> In this context, fixed costs are all the costs that do not vary with output during the year. The non-fixed generation costs include fuel and consumables, such as the limestone used in the Fayette scrubbers. Some O&M and interim capital replacements that vary with the usage of the plant should also be treated as energy-related (just as the cost of oil changes is a function of mileage driven), but these costs are not generally disaggregated in cost of service studies.

1 But the cost of the capacity is determined in large part by annual energy  
 2 requirements. As shown in Figure 1, South Texas and Fayette were much  
 3 more expensive than the contemporaneous Decker peakers, the Decker steam  
 4 plants are more expensive than the Decker peakers (even though those were  
 5 built over a decade later) and the Sand Hill combined-cycle cost about twice  
 6 as much as the Sand Hill peakers.<sup>2</sup>

7 **Figure 1: Cost of Generation Capacity, 2012 Test Year**



8  
 9 Clearly, Austin Energy invested more for South Texas, Fayette and the  
 10 combined-cycle plant to reap the benefits of their lower fuel costs, to serve  
 11 Austin Energy's large annual energy requirement. Since the lower fuel cost is

---

<sup>2</sup> A similar pattern is apparent in the operating costs per kilowatt: nuclear O&M is very high, coal O&M is lower, and the costs of gas units are much lower, with combustion turbine peakers at the low end of the range.

1 allocated among classes on the basis of energy use, the higher capital costs  
2 should follow a similar allocator.

3 **Q: How should this reality be reflected in cost allocation?**

4 A: Several methodologies have been developed to recognize the contribution of  
5 energy requirements and non-peak hours to the cost of generation resources,  
6 including:

- 7 • Identification of the extra costs of each resource incurred for fuel-price  
8 reduction, and allocation of those costs on energy (the peaker method).
- 9 • Determination of which resources operate in each hour (or larger blocks  
10 of time) and allocation of the costs of the units operating in each hour in  
11 proportion to class loads in each period (the probability of dispatch  
12 method).
- 13 • Sub-functionalization of the generation resources into usage categories  
14 (typically, base, intermediate and peak) and allocation of each category  
15 on an appropriate allocator, such as energy for baseload plant, daily  
16 peak hours (e.g., 7 AM to 11 PM) for intermediate resources, and peak  
17 loads (e.g., 12CP) for peakers (the base-intermediate-peak or BIP  
18 method).

19 Proper application of any of these three methods reflects the cost  
20 causation for fixed generation costs.

21 Other jurisdictions recognize the reality of energy-driven power-plant  
22 capital investment and fixed operating costs in a more generic manner, by  
23 allocating a portion (frequently the system load factor) of total fixed costs on  
24 energy and the remainder on some demand allocator. The average-and-peak  
25 approach does not reflect the actual fuel-saving investment and thus typically

1 understates the energy-related portion of generation systems with large shares  
2 of nuclear or coal capacity.

3 Any of these approaches is more equitable than the 12CP and AED  
4 approach.

5 **Q: Have you estimated the portion of Austin Energy’s generation  
6 investment that is driven by peak loads, rather than energy?**

7 A: Yes. I compared the 2012 costs of the South Texas, Fayette and Decker  
8 steam plant to the cost of the Decker peakers and the cost of the Sand Hill  
9 combined-cycle to the Sand Hill peakers, and produced the estimates of the  
10 shares of costs attributable to providing peak reliability shown in Table 1.

11 **Table 1: Demand-Related Portion of Austin Energy Generation Rate Base**

	ISD	MW	\$/kW	Attributable to Demand
South Texas	1989	400	\$442	3%
Fayette	1989	600	\$131	10%
Decker Steam	1975	730	\$41	32%
Sand Hill CC	2004	385	\$78	53%
Decker Peakers	1988	200	\$13	100%
Sand Hill Peakers	2004	270	\$41	100%
Total		2,585	\$127	16%

12 Those, 84% of total generation rate base is energy-related. The O&M  
13 fraction is probably even higher.

14 **Q: How should the costs of renewable energy be classified?**

15 A: The costs of wind and solar are almost all energy-driven, and Austin Energy  
16 classifies them to energy.<sup>3</sup>

17 **Q: What is your recommendation on this issue?**

---

<sup>3</sup> It is my understanding that Austin Energy recovers the costs of its renewable contracts through the Power Supply Adjustment, so those costs are not directly part of this proposed rate case.



1 A: The fixed costs of Austin Energy generation should be classified and/or  
2 allocated in a manner that recognizes that the vast majority of that investment  
3 is driven by energy, not peak demands.

4 **IV. Residential Rate Design**

5 **A. Tiered Energy Rate**

6 **Q: Have you reviewed Austin Energy’s proposal to flatten Austin Energy’s**  
7 **five-tiered in-city rates?**

8 A: Yes, I am aware that Austin Energy is proposing to make two major changes  
9 in Austin’s five-tier rate design. First, Austin Energy proposes to eliminate  
10 the separate summer and winter energy rates.<sup>4</sup> Second, Austin Energy  
11 proposes to flatten the tiers by raising the first tier (0–500 kWh) 40% on an  
12 annual average basis, while substantially decreasing the highest three tiers.

13 **Table 2: Proposed Change in Residential In-City Energy Tiers**

	Existing Base Rates			Proposed	Change
	Summer	Winter	Sales-Wtd.		
0–500	\$0.033	\$0.018	\$0.024	\$0.033	40%
501–1,000	\$0.080	\$0.056	\$0.068	\$0.056	-17%
1,000–1,500	\$0.091	\$0.072	\$0.083	\$0.076	-9%
1,500–2,500	\$0.110	\$0.084	\$0.100	\$0.091	-9%
>2,500	\$0.114	\$0.096	\$0.107	\$0.106	-1%
Average 0–1,000			\$0.039	\$0.041	5%

14 The average energy rate for a customer using 1,000 kWh would rise  
15 5%, but the rate for 500–1,000 kWh (the tailblock for these customers),  
16 which provides the incentive to conserve, would fall 17%. Bills would be  
17 higher, but the incentive to conserve would decline. The vast majority of

---

<sup>4</sup> The Power Supply Adjustment would retain very modest seasonality.

1 econometric analyses indicate that consumers respond to their tailblock  
2 energy rates.

3 **Q: Are these changes warranted?**

4 A: No. Elimination of the seasonal differentiation is counter-intuitive, since the  
5 majority of Austin Energy's transmission and distribution costs appear to be  
6 driven by summer loads, including peak loads on Austin Energy equipment  
7 and the day-long and multi-day loads that build up heat, requiring larger  
8 transformers and conductors and resulting in more failure.

9 The decrease in the revenue requirement should be spread more evenly  
10 through the tiers, to maintain conservation incentives.

11 **Q: What are your recommendations on this issue?**

12 A: Austin Energy should maintain some differential between summer and winter  
13 rates. In addition, the rates in each block (averaged across summer and  
14 winter) should be reduced by approximately the same percentage to reflect  
15 the overall reduction in target revenue.

16 **B. Fixed Customer Charges**

17 **Q: What is Austin Energy's proposal for the fixed customer charge in the  
18 residential rate design?**

19 A: Austin Energy proposes to retain the existing \$10/month charge.

20 **Q: Is this appropriate?**

21 A: The \$10 customer charge appears to be reasonable for most residential  
22 customers. The Austin Energy cost of service study (Schedule G-8) indicates  
23 that the allocated average customer-related cost for residential customers is  
24 \$21.68/month, but this estimate is clearly overstated. This total includes the  
25 cost of the average residential meter, a number of costs allocated on among

1 classes on unweighted customer number (Customer Accounting, Customer  
2 Service, Meter Reading), and uncollectible bills, all averaged across all  
3 residential customers. Several of these items are over-allocated to the  
4 residential class and/or to the customer charge, which should reflect only the  
5 costs imposed by the smallest customers.

6 Customer accounting, customer service and meter reading are probably  
7 all higher per customer for non-residential customers with more complex  
8 metering and billing.<sup>5</sup> Customers with higher bills are also more likely to  
9 contact Austin Energy more frequently, with more complex questions about  
10 their bills, service and other issues; this effect would both increase the non-  
11 residential share of customer service costs and reduce the customer-service  
12 costs attributable to the minimal customer. After all, a customer using 200  
13 kWh monthly is not likely to spend as much time on the phone with Austin  
14 Energy as a customer using 2,000 kWh or 20,000 kWh.

15 Uncollectibles probably also vary with the size of the residential  
16 customer. A 200-kWh customer is unlikely to run up a bill as large as a 2,000  
17 kWh customer; Austin Energy is exposed to larger bad debt from the larger  
18 customers.

19 All the size-related costs should be recovered through the energy  
20 charge.

21 **Q: Is any disaggregation of the customer charge warranted within the**  
22 **residential class?**

---

<sup>5</sup> In addition, the distance between meters is likely to be greater for large commercial and industrial customers than for even single-family residential customers, requiring more meter-reader time per reading.

1 A: Yes. Customers in multi-family buildings probably require even less meter-  
 2 reading time than single-family residential; the diversification of loads on  
 3 services, transformers and some lines and the generally higher density of load  
 4 would further reduce demand-related costs. A discount in the customer  
 5 charge for apartments would reflect these cost differential. Until Austin  
 6 Energy does a more complete analysis of the cost differentials, it would be  
 7 reasonable to customers in multi-family buildings a customer charge a few  
 8 dollars lower than the charge assessed on single-family residences.

9 **V. Rate Discounts Outside the City**

10 **Q: What comments do you have on rate discounts for customers outside the**  
 11 **city limits?**

12 A: I have not reviewed the rationale for the magnitude of the discount as a  
 13 percent of total bills, and will not comment on that issue. Regardless of the  
 14 size of the discount, the design of the rates outside the city should maintain  
 15 the conservation incentives.

16 Austin Energy’s proposed rates would continue the existing practice of  
 17 concentrating the out-of-city discount on the highest energy blocks,  
 18 significantly reducing the conservation incentive for large residential  
 19 customers. The magnitude of the discounts is shown in Table 2.

20 **Table 3: Austin Energy Proposed Discounts for Out-of-City Residential Rates**

	In City	Out of City	Discount
Customer charge	\$10	\$10	0%
0-500 kWh	\$0.03300	\$0.03800	15%
501-1,000 kWh	\$0.05600	\$0.05600	0%
1,000-1,500 kWh	\$0.07595	\$0.07815	3%
1,500-2,500 kWh	\$0.09100	\$0.07815	-14%
>2,500 kWh	\$0.10595	\$0.07815	-26%

1           Given Austin Energy’s projection of the pattern of out-of-city usage, the  
2           average discount is only 6.7%, but the tailblock rates that are most important  
3           in promoting conservation are discounted much more deeply.

4   **Q: What would be a more sensible approach for determining the discounts**  
5   **for out-of-city residential customers?**

6   A: If the 6.7% discount is determined to be appropriate, it should be spread  
7   more uniformly through the rate structure. Ideally, the customer charge and  
8   first 1,500 kWh would receive the average discount, and usage over 1,500  
9   kWh should be priced higher than usage in the 1,000–1,500 kWh range, to  
10   retain the incentive structure.

## 11   **VI. Fayette Costs**

12   **Q: What is your concern about the recovery of the costs of Austin Energy’s**  
13   **share of units 1 and 2 of the Fayette coal plant?**

14   A: Austin Energy and the City Council have committed to ending Austin  
15   Energy’s involvement in the Fayette project “as soon as legally, economically  
16   and technologically possible.” (Austin Energy Resource, Generation and  
17   Climate Protection Plan to 2025: An Update of the 2020 Plan,” page 7). That  
18   Plan projects that Austin Energy would stop using 235 MW of Fayette 2020  
19   and the remaining 367 MW would be retired in 2023.<sup>6</sup>

20           Before the City Council made this commitment, Austin Energy must  
21   have expected to continue using Fayette (and the scrubbers added about  
22   2010, which comprise most of the net plant) for many years. At the current

---

<sup>6</sup> The Plan Update says it “establishes a process for ending the use of coal by starting the retirement of Austin Energy’s share of the Fayette Power Project by the end of 2022.”

1 depreciation rate, Austin Energy customers would continue paying for the  
2 capital costs of Fayette through about 2030. I have not been able to determine  
3 when the bonds issued to finance the scrubbers will be fully paid off.<sup>7</sup>

4 Unless something changes in the meantime, Austin Energy will stop  
5 receiving energy and capacity from Fayette in the early 2020s, but will  
6 continue paying for the plant for several more years. At the same time, Austin  
7 Energy will be paying for the replacement energy resources, either through  
8 purchased-power contracts or directly for the capital costs.

9 Austin Energy's response to Public Citizen/Sierra Club 2-1 indicates  
10 that Austin Energy expected in December 2014 that it would fund Fayette  
11 debt defeasement at a rate of about \$47 million annually for 2019 through  
12 2022. Unless Austin Energy is planning another rate review in 2018 to allow  
13 it to collect those funds, this is likely to be the last opportunity to accumulate  
14 those funds.

15 **Q: How does Austin Energy propose to deal with this issue?**

16 A: Oddly, Austin Energy seems to be ignoring its commitment (and that of the  
17 City) to the early termination of its use of Fayette.

---

<sup>7</sup> Austin Energy may be able to repurpose that debt to finance the renewables that will replace Fayette. I have not found any specific reference to any of Austin Energy's debt issuances as being contractually tied to ownership of Fayette; Austin Energy does not seem to provide much information about its bonds in its annual reports or on its web site; some information about call dates and final retirement schedules is provided in ALIC RFI Set 4.

1 To date, City Council has not approved a definitive date for closing the  
2 FPP. Additionally, any decision on FPP would be subject to the City's  
3 affordability goals. Moreover, FPP Units 1 and 2 are jointly owned with  
4 the Lower Colorado River Authority ("LCRA") and operated by the  
5 LCRA. Therefore, neither AE, nor the City Council, has the authority to  
6 decommission the facility without cooperation from LCRA. For these  
7 reasons, it is premature to develop a defeasement fund at this time and  
8 the adjustment does not meet the known and measureable criteria.  
9 (Dombroski Rebuttal at 22–23)

10 **Q: Is Austin Energy's position reasonable?**

11 A: No. The Austin City Council has clearly created an expectation through  
12 approval of the 2025 Generation Plan that Austin Energy should plan to stop  
13 using the plant in 2022, though challenges do remain. The exact retirement  
14 date for a generator is rarely known until the last year or so of its life (and  
15 sometimes not until after it has stopped generating power). Despite this  
16 uncertainty, utilities attempt to recover the plant investments over the  
17 estimated remaining life of the equipment, and update the depreciation rates  
18 as new data on investments and retirement dates become available.

19 Similarly, it is not clear how Austin Energy will divest itself from  
20 Fayette. That divestiture could be effected through such mechanisms as the  
21 following:

- 22 • Agreement with LCRA to retire both units.
- 23 • Agreement to swap entitlements with LCRA and retire the unit  
24 then owned by Austin Energy.

25 Other arrangements may also be developed.

26 In any case, Austin Energy will no longer have a Fayette power-supply  
27 entitlement. Once that occurs, any remaining Fayette capital costs will be a  
28 deadweight burden on Austin Energy ratepayers.

1 **Q: How do affordability goals affect the prudence of accelerating the**  
2 **recovery of the Fayette investment?**

3 A: Delaying the write-down of the Fayette investment would exacerbate any  
4 affordability issues in the early 2020s, since Austin Energy would be  
5 recovering Fayette costs at the same time it would be acquiring new  
6 resources. Austin Energy might also need to recover the remaining Fayette  
7 costs over fewer years; recovering all the costs from Public Citizen/Sierra  
8 Club 2-1 in 2021 and 2022 would push Austin Energy's projected rate  
9 increases to the limits of its affordability guidelines. An overhang of  
10 undepreciated Fayette costs could create a poison pill preventing Austin  
11 Energy and the City from complying with its carbon-reduction goals.  
12 Reducing the rate decrease in this proceeding to start the recovery of excess  
13 Fayette costs would help preserve later affordability.

14 **Q: What do you recommend with regard to this issue?**

15 A: The Council should require Austin Energy to accelerate the recovery of  
16 Fayette's remaining capital cost, with the goal of fully paying off the capital  
17 investment by the end of 2022. Since this may well be the last rate review  
18 prior to the planned retirement of the first portion of Fayette in 2020, this  
19 may be the Council's last opportunity to mitigate this problem.

20 I have no recommendation regarding the accounting treatment of the  
21 accelerated cost recovery, which could take the form of increased  
22 depreciation, an unrestricted decommissioning reserve (which might be  
23 assigned between Fayette and Decker, as needed), a dedicated bond  
24 defeasement fund, or some other account. The important consideration is that  
25 the money be available to support the elimination of Austin's share of  
26 Fayette, when it is needed.



1 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**

2 **A: Yes.**