

**BEFORE THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN**

Application of Wisconsin Power and Light)
Company for Authority to Adjust) Docket No. 6680-UR-120
Electric and Natural Gas Rates)
For 2017 and 2018 Test Years)

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN WALLACH
ON BEHALF OF THE CITIZENS UTILITY BOARD OF WISCONSIN**

September 21, 2016

1 **I. Introduction**

2 **Q: Please state your name, occupation, and business address.**

3 A: My name is Jonathan F. Wallach. I am Vice President of Resource Insight, Inc.,
4 5 Water Street, Arlington, Massachusetts.

5 **Q: Are you the same Jonathan F. Wallach that filed direct testimony in this**
6 **proceeding?**

7 A: Yes.

8 **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying?**

9 A: I am testifying on behalf of CUB.

10 **Q: What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

11 A: My rebuttal testimony responds to direct testimony by:

- 12 • Commission staff witness Kate Christensen regarding her adjustments to
13 the Company's cost of service studies to reflect the results of Commission
14 staff's annual fuel audit.

- 1 • Kavita Maini, on behalf of Wisconsin Industrial Energy Group (WIEG),
2 regarding the classification and allocation of production and distribution
3 plant costs and in support of the development of market-based rates for
4 industrial customers.
- 5 • Daniel Tyson Steadman Cook, on behalf of Clean Wisconsin, regarding his
6 proposal to implement “opt-out” pilots for residential time-of-day and
7 demand rates.

8 **II. Response to Ms. Christensen**

9 **Q: Please summarize Commission staff witness Ms. Christensen’s direct**
10 **testimony regarding her adjustments to the Company’s cost of service**
11 **studies.**

12 A: Ms. Christensen adjusted the Company’s cost of service studies to reflect the
13 results of Commission staff’s annual fuel audit. Specifically, Ms. Christensen
14 increased 2017 and 2018 test year revenue requirements by about \$4.4 million
15 to reflect Commission staff’s adjustments to monitored fuel costs.¹ This \$4.4
16 million increase was allocated to rate classes in proportion to each class’s energy
17 sales. The results of the adjusted studies are shown at Direct-PSC-Christensen-4.

18 **Q: Did Ms. Christensen reasonably allocate the \$4.4 million increase in test**
19 **year revenue requirements resulting from Commission staff’s adjustments**
20 **to monitored fuel costs?**

¹ Ms. Christensen’s adjustments are contained in ‘COSS Summary.xlsx’, which was provided in Commission staff’s response to Data Request CUB-1 on September 12, 2016. The \$4.4 million increase in 2017 and 2018 test year revenue requirements was derived by Commission staff witness Mary Kettle, as shown in Schedule 1 of Ex.-PSC-Kettle-1.

1 A: Yes. Ms. Christensen’s allocation of the \$4.4 million fuel-related increase is
2 consistent with the allocation of fuel costs in the Company’s cost of service
3 studies.

4 **Q: Based on the results of the adjusted cost of service studies, how would you**
5 **allocate test year revenue requirements?**

6 A: Based on the directional results of the adjusted studies, I recommend that 2017
7 test year revenues be allocated to customer classes as shown in Table 1. I
8 developed this allocation with the goal of narrowing the difference for all
9 classes between the allocated revenue increase and the system average increase
10 in order to avoid rate shock for any one class.

11 **Table 1: Adjusted COSS-Based Allocation of 2017 Test Year Revenues**

	Current Revenue	Proposed Revenue	Revenue Increase	Percent Increase
Residential	414,738,377	429,114,310	14,375,933	3.5%
General Service	189,828,118	192,706,478	2,878,360	1.5%
Commercial	115,617,604	115,617,604	-	0.0%
Industrial	409,452,293	409,452,293	-	0.0%
Lighting	8,285,992	8,285,992	-	0.0%
Total System	1,137,922,385	1,155,176,678	17,254,293	1.5%

12
13 I further recommend that the rates established to recover allocated 2017
14 test year revenues remain fixed for the 2018 test year as well. Based on the
15 Company’s forecast of class billing determinants, fixing rates at 2017 test year
16 levels would allow forecasted 2018 test year revenue requirements to be
17 recovered from each customer class in the same proportion as my recommended
18 allocation of forecasted 2017 test year revenue requirements.

1 **III. Response to Ms. Maini**

2 **A. *Classification and Allocation of Production Plant Costs***

3 **Q: What does WIEG witness Ms. Maini propose with regard to the**
4 **classification and allocation of production plant costs?**

5 A: Ms. Maini proposes that all production plant costs be classified as demand-
6 related, and that all such demand-related costs be allocated using a 3CP
7 allocator.

8 **Q: What is the basis for Ms. Maini's proposal that all production plant costs be**
9 **classified as demand-related?**

10 A: Ms. Maini offers three arguments in support of her proposal to classify all
11 production plant costs as demand-related. First, Ms. Maini argues that only peak
12 loads, and not system energy requirements, drive investments in production
13 plant.² Second, Ms. Maini argues that all production plant costs should be
14 classified as demand-related, because such costs, once incurred, do not vary
15 with energy usage.³ Finally, Ms. Maini argues that classifying a portion of
16 production plant costs as energy-related distorts price signals because costs
17 classified as energy-related would be shifted from the demand charge to the off-
18 peak energy charge.⁴

19 I respond to each of Ms. Maini's arguments in turn.

20 **Q: Are production plant costs incurred solely for the purposes of meeting peak**
21 **demand, as Ms. Maini contends?**

² Direct-WIEG-Maini-15.

³ *Id.*

⁴ Direct-WIEG-Maini-19.

1 A: No. If, as Ms. Maini claims, WPL added production plant solely for the
2 purposes of meeting reserve requirements, then the Company's resource
3 portfolio would consist solely of peaking generation since peaking units would
4 be the cheapest option for meeting an increase in planning reserve requirements.
5 In reality, WPL has invested in not just peaking plant, but also more-expensive
6 baseload generation in order to minimize the cost of meeting system energy
7 requirements.

8 From a cost-causation perspective, the additional plant cost incurred for a
9 baseload plant over that for a peaking plant is appropriately classified as energy-
10 related because this additional cost is incurred to meet energy requirements at
11 lowest total cost.

12 **Q: Should cost classification depend on whether production plant costs vary**
13 **with energy usage once such costs are ratebased, as Ms. Maini contends?**

14 A: No. From a cost-causation perspective, the relevant consideration for classifying
15 production plant costs is not the extent to which such costs vary with energy
16 usage once those costs have been placed in ratebase, but the extent to which the
17 Company's investments in production plant were driven by increases in
18 planning-reserve or energy requirements. From this perspective, it would be
19 unreasonable to classify all production plant costs as demand-related, since
20 investments in baseload and cycling plant were driven by the need to meet both
21 reliability and energy requirements.

22 **Q: Do you agree with Ms. Maini that price signals would be distorted if a**
23 **portion of production plant costs were classified as energy-related?**

24 A: I do not. To the contrary, energy-related production plant costs are appropriately
25 recovered through energy charges since, as discussed above, energy usage drives
26 investment in baseload plant and thus causes utilities to incur production plant

1 costs in excess of amounts that would be incurred for equivalent peaking
2 capacity. This excess spending should therefore be classified as energy-related
3 and recovered through energy charges.

4 **Q: Why does Ms. Maini recommend allocating demand-related production**
5 **plant costs using a 3CP allocator?**

6 A: Ms. Maini argues that it is appropriate to use a 3CP allocator because the
7 Company's investments in production plant are driven solely by peak demands
8 in the three summer months and because there is excess capacity on the
9 Company's system during the non-summer months which allows WPL to
10 schedule planned maintenance.

11 **Q: Are investments in production plant driven solely by monthly peaks during**
12 **the summer?**

13 A: No. Peak demands during non-summer months also contribute to annual loss of
14 load expectation (LOLE) and thus system reserve requirements. Consequently,
15 peak demands in non-summer months also contribute to the need for
16 investments in demand-related production plant.

17 Ms. Maini mistakes cause for effect with regard to the availability of
18 excess capacity to offset capacity reductions from planned maintenance in non-
19 summer months. The amount of capacity required in excess of summer peak –
20 i.e., the annual reserve margin – is determined in part by the daily contribution
21 to annual LOLE as a result of planned maintenance during the non-summer
22 months. In other words, the MISO reserve requirement is set at that percentage
23 margin over summer peak that ensures that LOLE over the year, including the
24 contribution to LOLE during times of planned maintenance, is less than one day
25 in ten years. Thus, it's not that capacity reserves in excess of summer peak allow
26 for planned maintenance in non-summer months, as Ms. Maini contends.

1 Instead, it's that the impact of planned maintenance on annual LOLE drives in
2 part the amount of capacity needed in excess of summer peak to maintain
3 system reliability.

4 **Q: What do you conclude from your review of Ms. Maini's proposal for**
5 **classifying and allocating production plant costs?**

6 A: Contrary to Ms. Maini's claim, the Company's investments in production plant
7 are driven by both reliability and energy requirements. Consequently, production
8 plant costs are appropriately classified as both demand- and energy-related.

9 Moreover, demand-related production plant costs incurred to meet reserve
10 requirements are driven by demand in both summer and non-summer months.
11 The 12CP allocator is therefore a more reasonable measure of each class's
12 contribution to the need for new reserve capacity than the 3CP allocator.

13 **B. *Classification of Distribution Plant Costs***

14 **Q: Please summarize Ms. Maini's direct testimony with regard to the**
15 **classification of distribution plant costs.**

16 A: Ms. Maini supports use of the minimum distribution system method for
17 classifying distribution plant costs because:

18 ... to the extent that the utility incurs a distribution cost simply to connect a
19 customer to its system, regardless of that customer's size, it is appropriate
20 to assign the cost of these minimal facilities to rate schedules on the basis
21 of the number of customers, rather than on the kW demand of the class.⁵

22 **Q: How do you respond to Ms. Maini's argument in favor of the minimum**
23 **distribution system classification approach?**

⁵ Direct-WIEG-Maini-20.

1 A: The problem with Ms. Maini’s argument is that it presumes that WPL incurs
2 costs for poles, conduits, wires, and transformers “simply to connect a customer
3 to its system, regardless of that customer’s size.” In fact, it is unlikely that the
4 Company would add distribution equipment other than a meter and a service
5 drop just to connect an additional customer with minimal load. Thus, it would
6 not be consistent with cost-causation to classify the costs of distribution
7 equipment other than meters and services as customer-related, as would be the
8 case using the minimum distribution system classification approach.

9 Instead, as is the case in the Company’s Locational COSS, meter and
10 services costs should be classified as customer-related and all other distribution
11 plant costs should be classified as demand-related.

12 **C. *Market-Based Rate Options***

13 **Q: At Direct-WIEG-Maini-5, Ms. Maini indicates that WIEG is interested in**
14 **working with WPL and Commission staff to develop market-based rate**
15 **options for industrial customers. How do you respond?**

16 A: It is critical that such rate options be designed to avoid cost-shifting from the
17 industrial class to other customer classes. It would be wholly inappropriate to
18 implement a market-based rate option that allows industrial customers to evade
19 responsibility for sunk production plant costs incurred by WPL to serve such
20 customers and then pass those costs on to other customer classes.

21 **IV. Response to Mr. Cook**

22 **Q: At Direct-Clean Wisconsin-Cook-9, Clean Wisconsin witness Mr. Cook**
23 **recommends that WPL consider implementing a pilot program where**

1 **randomly selected residential customers are moved to time of day rates on**
2 **an opt-out basis. How do you respond?**

3 A: I want to note that CUB generally supports efforts to improve the efficacy and
4 increase customer acceptance of time of day (TOD) rates. However, CUB has a
5 number of concerns regarding Mr. Cook's specific suggestion in this case that
6 residential customers be moved to TOD rates without their consent and then be
7 required to actively opt-out in order to be placed back on standard rates. In
8 particular, CUB is concerned about potential adverse impacts on low-income or
9 other vulnerable residents in multi-family buildings who may not be able to
10 modify usage patterns in order to avoid high on-peak prices.

11 If relatively few customers have chosen to opt in to the current voluntary
12 TOD rate, the solution should not be to force customers onto the TOD rate and
13 then require them to opt out if they are dissatisfied. Instead, the Commission
14 should direct WPL to identify where and how the current rate structure creates
15 barriers to customer participation and to evaluate design modifications to make
16 the TOD rate more attractive to residential customers.

17 **Q: At Direct-Clean Wisconsin-Cook-18, Clean Wisconsin witness Mr. Cook**
18 **recommends that WPL consider implementing a pilot program where**
19 **randomly selected residential customers are moved to demand rates on an**
20 **opt-out basis. How do you respond?**

21 A: CUB has the same concerns about an opt-out demand rate pilot as it does about
22 an opt-out TOD rate pilot, only more so given concerns (shared by Mr. Cook)
23 that residential customers would have limited ability to control their maximum
24 demands in response to demand charges.

25 **Q: Does this complete your rebuttal testimony?**

26 A: Yes.