

BEFORE THE NOVA SCOTIA UTILITY AND REVIEW BOARD

**In the Matter of the Electricity Act)
and)
the Tidal Energy Feed-in Tariff Rate)
for Development Tidal Arrays)**

Matter No. M05092

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
PAUL CHERNICK
ON BEHALF OF
THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE**

Resource Insight, Inc.

AUGUST 30, 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Identification 1

II. Introduction and Summary 3

III. Tidal Feed-in-Tariff Rate Design 7

IV. Proposed Tidal Feed-in-Tariff Rate Levels 8

V. Shaping Rates Over Time 10

TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit PC-1 *Professional Qualifications of Paul Chernick*

1 **I. Identification**

2 **Q: Mr. Chernick, please state your name, occupation, and business address.**

3 A: I am Paul L. Chernick. I am the president of Resource Insight, Inc., 5 Water St,
4 Arlington, Massachusetts.

5 **Q: Summarize your professional education and experience.**

6 A: I received an SB degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in June
7 1974 from the Civil Engineering Department, and an SM degree from the
8 Massachusetts Institute of Technology in February 1978 in technology and
9 policy. I have been elected to membership in the civil engineering honorary
10 society Chi Epsilon, and the engineering honor society Tau Beta Pi, and to
11 associate membership in the research honorary society Sigma Xi.

12 I was a utility analyst for the Massachusetts Attorney General for more
13 than three years, and was involved in numerous aspects of utility rate design,
14 costing, load forecasting, and the evaluation of power supply options. Since
15 1981, I have been a consultant in utility regulation and planning, first as a
16 research associate at Analysis and Inference, after 1986 as president of PLC,
17 Inc., and in my current position at Resource Insight. In these capacities, I have
18 advised a variety of clients on utility matters.

19 My work has considered, among other things, the cost-effectiveness of pro-
20 spective new electric generation plants and transmission lines, retrospective
21 review of generation-planning decisions, ratemaking for plant under construc-
22 tion, ratemaking for excess and/or uneconomical plant entering service, conser-
23 vation program design, cost recovery for utility efficiency programs, the valua-
24 tion of environmental externalities from energy production and use, allocation of
25 costs of service between rate classes and jurisdictions, design of retail and

1 wholesale rates, and performance-based ratemaking and cost recovery in restruc-
2 tured gas and electric industries. My professional qualifications are further
3 summarized in Exhibit PC-1.

4 **Q: Have you testified previously in utility proceedings?**

5 A: Yes. I have testified more than 250 times on utility issues before various
6 regulatory, legislative, and judicial bodies, including utility regulators in thirty
7 states and five Canadian provinces, and two U.S. Federal agencies. This testi-
8 mony has included the review of many utility-proposed power plants and
9 purchased-power contracts.

10 **Q: Have you testified previously regarding procurement of renewable and**
11 **distributed energy resources?**

12 A: Yes. I have testified in numerous proceedings on avoided costs and tariff
13 designs, as listed in my resume.

14 **Q: Have you previously testified before this Board?**

15 A: Yes. I testified in the Board's review of the following cases:

- 16 • Nova Scotia Power's Demand Side Management Plan for 2010 and
17 Demand Side Management Cost Recovery Rider in May 2009 (Matter No.
18 01439).
- 19 • The proposed purchased-power agreement between Nova Scotia Power
20 Inc. ("NSPI") and a biomass project to be constructed at the NewPage Port
21 Hawkesbury pulp and paper mill (Matter No. 01496).
- 22 • Nova Scotia Power's proposal to build the biomass project at NewPage
23 Port Hawkesbury (Matter No. 02961).
- 24 • Heritage Gas's 2010 rate case (Matter No. 03454).
- 25 • Nova Scotia Power's proposal to increase production depreciation rates
26 (Matter No. 03665).

- 1 • The Board’s review of proposed feed-in tariffs for certain distribution-
2 connected renewable projects (Matter No. 03632).
- 3 • The Nova Scotia Power general rate application (Matter No. 04104), with
4 respect to cost allocation and rate design.
- 5 • The Board’s review of proposed a proposed load-retention tariff and rate
6 (Matter No. 04175).
- 7 • The application of Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation (ENSC) Electricity
8 Demand-Side Management Plan for 2013–2015 (Matter No. 04819).
- 9 • The application of NSPI and Pacific West Commercial Corporation for a
10 load-retention rate mechanism for the Port Hawkesbury paper mill (Matter
11 No. 04862).
- 12 • The Board’s review of NSPI’s 2013 Annual Capital Expenditure Plan
13 (Matter No. 05339).
- 14 • The application of NSPI for approval of the South Canoe Wind Project
15 (Matter No. 05416).
- 16 • The Board’s review of the Maritime Link proposal (Matter No. 05419).
- 17 I have also assisted the Consumer Advocate in preparing comments in the
18 Board’s reviews of NPSI’s Nuttby, Digby, and Point Tupper wind project
19 proposals (Matters Nos. 02195, 02763 and 02983), NSPI’s Renewable Energy
20 Tax and Accounting Depreciation (Matter No. 03795), the Capital Expenditure
21 Justification Criteria review (Matter No. 04600), and the Renewable RFP
22 (Matter No. 04838).

23 **II. Introduction and Summary**

24 **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying?**

25 A: My testimony is sponsored by the Nova Scotia Consumer Advocate.

1 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?**

2 A: I offer the Board some insights into the shortcomings of the Tidal Feed-in Tariff
3 (FIT) rates proposed by the Board's consultant, Synapse Energy Economics, Inc.,
4 in the prefiled evidence of Geoffrey Keith and Mirko Previsic, August 16, 2013.

5 **Q: Please summarize your observations on the Tidal FIT rate proposal.**

6 A: Ratepayers, the province, and tidal developers would be better off if the Tidal
7 FIT rates were designed using a lower return target and allowing a significant
8 portion of the tariff escalate with inflation, rather than being fixed in advance.
9 The Board should also defer approval of any Tidal FIT rate until Synapse does a
10 better job of documenting its input assumptions.

11 **Q: Are there any overarching considerations that the Board should bear in
12 mind in approaching the task of setting Tidal FIT rates?**

13 A: Yes. Setting the Tidal FIT rates requires dealing with some important aspects of
14 this particular combination of technologies and regulatory process: availability
15 of data, limitations on the capacity to be allowed to sell under the Tidal FIT, and
16 the purpose of the Tidal FIT.

17 **Q: Please describe the data-availability issues in this proceeding.**

18 A: The basic problem is that the Tidal FIT rates cannot be derived from well-known
19 and easily reviewed data. The FIT regulations require that the FIT rates be based
20 on the costs of the technologies. Very few in-stream tidal projects have entered
21 service, even as test or demonstration units. Furthermore, the range of potential
22 costs for developmental in-stream tidal projects is quite wide, compared to the
23 wind plants that make up most of the potential (and most of the approved
24 capacity) in the Community FIT program.¹ Synapse estimates "that equipment

¹Approved COMFIT Projects Status, NS DOE.

1 costs for devices installed in the Bay of Fundy could range from \$4,200 to
2 \$5,500 per kW” (CA IR-11). The UK Carbon Trust estimates that the cost of
3 tidal projects will decline by about 20% over the first 30 MW or so of global
4 deployment (Accelerating Marine Energy: The Potential for Cost Reduction—
5 Insights from the Carbon Trust Marine Energy Accelerator, July 2011, Figure
6 22b). Synapse’s estimate of the cost for the developmental rate has varied as
7 follows:

- 8 • \$500/MWh for a 20-year contract and a 13% IRR in the initial May 24,
9 2013 draft tariffs, which would have been
 - 10 ○ \$514/MWh for the 15-year contract used in the later versions, or
 - 11 ○ \$454/MWh for 15 years and a 10% IRR;
- 12 • \$481/MWh for 15-year contract and a 10% IRR in the August 5, 2013
13 revised draft tariffs;
- 14 • \$545/MWh in the August 16, 2013 evidence.

15 This high level of uncertainty means that developing any cost-based rate
16 will require considerable judgment. Appropriately selecting the rate inputs will
17 require that those with access to data (particularly Synapse) share that
18 information with other parties and the Board.

19 **Q: Please describe the unusual aspects of the purposes of the Tidal FIT.**

20 A: The Tidal FIT is not intended primarily to increase renewable energy supply in
21 Nova Scotia, as has been the case for the NSPI and NS DOE requests for
22 proposals, nor to allow local community entities to participate in renewable
23 development, as is the case for the Community FIT. Instead, it appears that the
24 Province has the “intention [for] the Developmental Tidal Feed-in Tariff (FIT)...
25 to support technology advancement and the development of a domestic industry
26 around tidal energy.” (NSDOE IR-1)

1 In terms of global competition as a site for tidal power development, Nova
2 Scotia appears to have a tidal resource as favorable as any in the world, and
3 much better working and living environments than northern Scotland or the
4 Orkneys, the major resource competitors. Installing, maintaining, and monitoring
5 tidal equipment would be feasible on many more days in the Bay of Fundy than
6 in the Pentland Firth. It should not be necessary for Nova Scotia to match the
7 UK rates currently offered (which Synapse estimates at \$422/MWh, subject to
8 the risks of varying market prices for renewable credits and energy) or proposed
9 (£305 or \$484/MWh, from Synapse Evidence at 34).

10 Nova Scotia's living and working environment may be more comparable to
11 Ireland and Maine, both of which have attracted tidal installations with much
12 lower rates: a FIT of €220 (about \$300/MWh) in Ireland and a negotiated
13 contract of \$215 USD/MWh (about \$221/MWh) in Maine (Synapse Evidence at
14 36). The setting of the Tidal FIT rate should recognize the nature of the
15 competition for establishing a tidal-power industry.


16 **Q: Please describe the implications of limits on Tidal FIT capacity.**

17 A: The amount of tidal capacity developed under the Tidal FIT will be limited by
18 the rate effect on consumers. This is in contrast to the Community FIT, which
19 was constrained by specific capacity limits (for small wind) and by access to
20 distribution lines. Higher Tidal FIT tariff rates would result in fewer megawatts
21 of tidal projects being permitted under the FIT. Development of fewer and
22 smaller tidal projects would tend to undermine the DOE's intention to establish a
23 local industry serving the global market. Developers are more likely to establish
24 research, development, and production facilities in Nova Scotia if they have
25 opportunities to deploy multiple projects representing multiple generations of
26 design and manufacture, at a price that is as good as is available in competitive

1 locations, than if they have a one-shot opportunity to install an array at a very
2 high price.

3 As shown in the below figure, about one less megawatt of tidal FIT array
4 can be accommodated under the 2% rate cap for every \$10/MWh increase in the
5 tariff in the \$300/MWh to \$400/MWh range, or for every \$20/MWh increase in
6 the tariff in the \$400/MWh to \$500/MWh range.²

7 Megawatts of Tidal Array for 2% Rate Increase as Function of FIT Rate



8
9 Considering the above, the benefits to Nova Scotia may be maximized by
10 tidal FIT array prices in the \$350–\$450/MWh range.

11 III. Tidal Feed-in-Tariff Rate Design

12 **Q: Putting aside the specific values in the proposed tariffs, has Synapse**
13 **proposed appropriate designs for the Tidal FIT?**

²This computation is based on Synapse’s response to NSPI IR-1, Table 2, assuming a 38% capacity factor, \$50/MWh avoided cost, \$1.3 billion in non-tidal revenue requirements, and no test units operating at the time the arrays are in full operation.

1 A: There is much positive in the proposed Tidal FIT rate design that is not typical in
2 feed-in tariffs, and Synapse should be commended for those features. Speci-
3 fically, Synapse deals well with the transition from initial test units to arrays,
4 and with the economies of scale.

5 Rather than treating an initial test unit and a subsequent array as two
6 separate projects, Synapse proposes treating the test unit and the array as two
7 phases of one project, with the higher test-unit tariff available for a single unit
8 for a maximum of three years. The rate for the follow-up array would be lower
9 than the rate for an array that did not receive the favorable test-unit tariff in the
10 early years.

11 Synapse also proposes declining block rates, so that larger units or arrays
12 would be paid a lower rate over some threshold. A lower rate should be adequate
13 for larger plants, due to economies of scale. In addition, the lower rate for large
14 arrays reduces the extent to which they would use up the rate impact headroom
15 allowed for the entire Tidal FIT program.

16 **IV. Proposed Tidal Feed-in-Tariff Rate Levels**

17 **Q: Has Synapse adequately explained the derivation of the proposed Tidal FIT**
18 **rates?**

19 A: No. Synapse does a good job of documenting the manner in which it computed
20 the Tidal FIT tariffs from the input cost and performance values (e.g., develop-
21 ment, construction, operation, decommissioning), and also provides a fair
22 amount of detail on the components of each cost category (e.g., structural
23 components; power take off, rotor and electrical; subsea interconnection; and
24 environmental monitoring systems as components of equipment costs).

1 Unfortunately, Synapse provides very little basis for most of those input
2 values. As I discuss in Section II, there is little real publicly available data on the
3 costs of in-stream tidal projects, so selecting any particular value requires the
4 exercise of judgment. Unfortunately, since Synapse has provided very little of
5 the data on which it relied, neither the parties nor the Board can review how
6 Synapse formed its judgments.

7 **Q: Can you provide some examples of inputs that Synapse could have docu-**
8 **mented more effectively?**

9 A: Yes. In particular, I would like to highlight two factors that should be amenable
10 to qualitative, data-based analysis: capacity factor and transmission losses.

11 Synapse offers no data to support its estimate of a 38% capacity factor.
12 From page 27 of Synapse’s evidence, it appears that the analysis was based on
13 water-velocity data from university research rather than proprietary corporate
14 sources. While it may be reasonable for Synapse to protect proprietary power-
15 curve data from specific manufacturers, that could be accomplished by aver-
16 aging the power curves of the multiple options, using “typical” power curves
17 that do not represent specific models, or by requiring a confidentiality under-
18 taking from parties to review the computation. As it stands, Synapse’s analysis is
19 cannot be meaningfully reviewed.

20 Similarly, Synapse does not document the origin of its estimate of 2%
21 transmission losses (Synapse Evidence at 27). Since the Nova Scotia system-
22 wide transmission losses—including step-up transformers, multiple levels of
23 substations and transmission voltages—over hundreds of kilometers from
24 Lingan, Pt. Aconi, and Pt. Tupper to the load centers, is only 3.23% of load (or
25 3.1% of generation), 2% losses seems quite large for the short interconnection of
26 the tidal plant to the system.

1 **Q: What rate of return does Synapse assume is necessary for the construction**
2 **of test and developmental units?**

3 A: Synapse assumes that a 10% return is required for all these units.

4 **Q: Is that 10% return target realistic?**

5 A: No. A 10% overall return is reasonable for commercial projects, although some
6 of that return would be debt. For example, the COMFIT rate for large wind is
7 based on a 50/50 mix of 13% equity and 8% debt, for a total return of 10.5%. In
8 contrast, the research, development, test and demonstration installations of any
9 new technology would typically recover less than their full cost, resulting in
10 negative return. Setting rates to provide any positive return would be generous
11 for the demonstration phase of any new product. A manufacturer would be lucky
12 to recover its full cost for demonstration projects, let alone earn a profit. Using
13 an IRR of about 5% would reduce the required first-block array tariff from
14 \$543.50/MWh to about \$459/MWh, a 15.6% reduction. That target return would
15 bring the array prices closer to the range competitive with other potential
16 development sites (such as Maine and the UK), offering an attractive price while
17 allowing more tidal projects or larger projects to be developed.

18 **V. Shaping Rates Over Time**

19 **Q: What options are there for shaping the Tidal FIT rates over time?**

20 A: Purchased-power rates may be designed with a range of temporal patterns,
21 including, among others, the following:

- 22 • flat in nominal terms (i.e., paying the same dollars-per-MWh rate in every
23 year of the contract),
- 24 • partially escalating with inflation (e.g., to nominally levelized the fixed
25 costs and roughly follow the escalation in operating costs over time),

1 • fully escalating with inflation (i.e., levelized in real terms).

2 Synapse has presented its rates in nominal terms, but acknowledges that
3 the rates could also be escalating (Synapse Evidence at 16–17). In its draft rates,
4 Synapse developed options for fully levelized rates and rates in which the O&M
5 component escalates. While the differences in the first-year rates are small,
6 escalating rates would have the following three advantages:

7 • Starting with lower rates in the first year may allow more Tidal FIT projects
8 to be developed under the 1% and 2% rate-increase caps that the DOE
9 intends to use to limit Tidal FIT contracts. In later years, escalation in labor,
10 fuel prices, operating costs and other rate components will tend to raise
11 average rates, leaving more room under the 2% rate-increase ceiling.

12 • Escalating a large portion of the rate with actual inflation will better track
13 the costs of labor, services and materials necessary to operate the tidal
14 plants, reducing the risks to the developers and owners of the plants.

15 • Reducing revenue requirements from the Tidal FIT in the near term will
16 avoid having the highest Tidal FIT revenue requirements coincide with the
17 highest rate effect of the Maritime Link. NSPI expects that the costs of the
18 Maritime Link will start to flow through retail rates in late 2017, peaking
19 in 2019 and then declining 11% through 2025 in nominal terms and 22% in
20 constant-dollar terms.³ In constant dollars, the Maritime Link revenue
21 requirements fall 23% by 2030, the final year of a 15-year Tidal FIT
22 starting in 2015. Whenever possible, the Board should attempt to minimize
23 other costs in the expensive early years of the Maritime Link.

³Maritime Link Application, Appendix 4.01.

1 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**

2 A: Yes.